An Initial Look at Technology and Institutions on Defense Industry Consolidation by Driessnack, John D. & King, David R.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Management Faculty Research and Publications Management, Department of
1-1-2004
An Initial Look at Technology and Institutions on
Defense Industry Consolidation
John D. Driessnack
USAF
David R. King
Marquette University
Published version. Acquisition Review Journal, Vol. 35, (2004): 63-77. DOI. © 2004 Defense
Acquisition University. Used with permission.
David R. King was affiliated with the U.S. Air Force at the time of publication.
Defense Acquisition Review Journal — January–April 2004
62
An Initial Look at Technology and Institutions on Defense Industry Consolidation
63
TUTORIAL
AN INITIAL LOOK AT TECHNOLOGY
AND INSTITUTIONS ON DEFENSE
INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
Lt Col John D. Driessnack, USAF and
Maj David R. King, Ph.D., USAF
Conventional wisdom holds that defense industry consolidation resulted from
decreased defense spending. However, we maintain that understanding dynamic
changes in key defense institutions helps provide a more complete explanation
for observed consolidation. Specifically, we examine the interaction of evolving
technology and changing institutions. Institutions reviewed include procurement
policies, the weapons requirements process, and procurement organizations.
We take an initial look at the industry, and highlight how these changes
influenced transaction costs in the defense industry, more fully explain the forces
driving consolidation, and provide greater insight to policy makers seeking to
improve the performance of the defense industry. Further research is needed
to build a robust institutional framework of the defense industry and the related
government agencies to allow better policy prescriptions.
Still much of the public discussion of weapons acquisition problems
proceeds as if the terms “competition,” “price,” “buying,” and
“seller” had the meanings they do in a market system.
(Peck & Scherer, 1962)
underutilization (e.g., Augustine, 1997;
Deutch, 2001) and has been accompanied
by concerns over the level of competition
between remaining prime contractors
(Ricks, 1996). Often the defense industry
is compared with a competitive market of
common commercial products and as-
sumed to be inefficient. However, com-
petitive markets of common commercial
Over the past 20 years, 75 plusUnited States defense specializedfirms/divisions merged into five
major defense firms, or prime contrac-
tors (Commission on the Future of the
Aerospace Industry, 2002). Almost uni-
versally the consolidation of the past 20
years has been explained as a result of
decreased defense spending or capacity
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products display multiple competitors and
customers where prices can be predicted
from given levels of supply and demand.
Meanwhile, a defense market with differ-
entiated weapon systems as products dis-
plays important differences from a classic
competitive market (Peck & Scherer, 1962;
Sapolsky & Gholz, 1998), and it should
be recognized that assumptions about the
applicability of competitive marketplaces
can result in dubious policy recommenda-
tions (King & Driessnack, 2003; Langlois
& Robertson, 1995).
Traditional explanations for the con-
solidation of the defense industry based
on decreased defense spending are not
consistent with a long-term view of the
industry. Although recent defense indus-
try consolidation is unprecedented, the U.S.
defense budget has followed a cyclical
pattern with both decreases and in-
creases in spending since 1952 (see Fig-
ure 1). This suggests that the most recent
defense industry consolidation has been
driven by factors beyond decreased de-
fense spending. Markusen’s (1998) pre-
diction that surviving defense firms would
become smaller and focus more on com-
mercial markets has not come to pass. For
example, while Boeing offers both com-
mercial and defense products, it grew
larger through its acquisition of McDonnell
Douglas, which increased its reliance on
defense. Additionally, although mergers
have consolidated the number of firms and
decreased the number of personnel em-
ployed by defense firms, Department of
Defense (DoD) Industrial Policy reports
consistently show industry capacity has not
undergone equivalent reductions.
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Peck and Scherer (1962) cautioned
against applying traditional assumptions
of a competitive price-driven market to the
defense industry as their applicability is
tenuous, at best. The defense market is
unique and displays an increased role of
government where it acts as both a buyer
of goods and regulator of the market.
Government actions predominate the
defense market as it sets the rules (e.g.,
regulates contract types) and alone is
responsible for uncertainty of demand as
the sole buyer of defense goods.1  Gov-
ernment represents an active institution in
the defense industry, and institutions con-
tribute to market structure by defining
transaction costs (Hoskisson, 2000). The
neo-classical economic view, which is
often the basis of current industrial poli-
cies, minimizes the role of transaction
costs and the impact of institutions on
firms.
Our contribution involves applying an
evolving framework called New Institu-
tional Economics (Greenwood & Hinings,
1996; North, 1999; Williamson, 1985) to
the defense industry. The result is an ini-
tial assessment of the impact of institu-
tions in changing transaction costs, and
the potential relationship these changes
played in the recently observed defense
industry consolidation. Existing research
has recognized that transaction costs play
a role in defense markets. For example,
Rogerson (1994) recognized the key role
of government in shaping the defense
procurement process and unique charac-
teristics that impact weapons procurement
incentives. He goes on to lament that
economics has largely been absent from
shaping defense industry institutions and
its regulatory environment because of the
unique nature of defense procurement.
Our goal is to facilitate a better under-
standing of the defense industry and its
efficiency by providing a framework that
allows more informed policy recom-
mendations through a better explanation
of the role of institutions in the defense
industry.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
Our analysis begins with a summary of
the defense industry. We define defense
firms similar to Chu and Waxman (1998)
as firms that have established capabilities
and competencies in dealing with the DoD.
An important implication of this definition
is that defense firms have evolved to be-
come specialized in the sense that they
focus on the transactions with a monop-
sony customer—the
agencies and organiza-
tions in the DoD and not
in any particular product
or technology. Our ini-
tial look focuses on the
top of the defense indus-
try hierarchy, the 5
firms, Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, Raytheon,
Northrop Grumman, and General Dynam-
ics, which have consolidated to increase
both their share of the defense business
and percentage of their business dependent
on defense work.
These defense firms are public firms,
but many of the similarities to commercial
firms operating in the U.S. market end
there. Defense firms sell unique products
in a monopsony where the only buyer is
the U.S. government. Contract competi-
tions typically involve situations where
‘winner takes all,’ and R&D costs for
“Defense firms
sell unique
products in a
monopsony
where the only
buyer is the U.S.
government.”
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their high-technology products are
largely subsidized (McNaughter, 1989;
Peck & Scherer, 1962). Viewing defense
firms as operating in a traditional com-
mercial market would
require that the special-
ized knowledge for do-
ing business with the
government could be
easily obtained (Chu &
Waxman, 1998). Fur-
ther understanding the
defense industry con-
solidation requires un-
derstanding a market defined by the trans-
actions with U.S. government procure-
ment offices utilizing highly stylized rules
for contracting. We employ New Institu-
tional Economics (NIE) to examine the
role technology and institutions played
in defense industry consolidation.
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
The basic unit of analysis or core of the
NIE framework is transaction costs and
how they are determined by the interac-
tion of changing institutions, environment,
and enforcement arrangements of formal
and informal market rules. When exam-
ining transaction costs, the question that
needs to be resolved is on what principal
dimension does a transaction differ
(Williamson, 1996). Additionally, Wil-
liamson indicates that similar effort is
needed to understand differences in
governance structures that bring order to
transactions.
Our analysis begins by examining
how defense industry transactions
changed as a result of the advancement
in technology and the need for integrated
weapons, evolving government institu-
tions, and impact of winner take al con-
tracts. Again, our goal is to see how chang-
ing institutions and transaction costs can
also help explain defense industry con-
solidation. We do not claim that these
forces are the only ones acting on defense
firms. Instead, we highlight that they rep-
resent contributing forces that have not
been previously examined, in compari-
son to decreased procurement funding.
Our findings suggest that changing insti-
tutions and transaction costs provides a
more complete story of the forces driv-
ing defense industry consolidation.
EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
Technological change can have exten-
sive impacts on the competitive dynamics
of industries (Anderson & Tushman,
1990). There are multiple unique tech-
nologies required for different categories
of weapon systems. We focus on provid-
ing examples from fighter aircraft where
significant advances in core and support-
ing technologies can be observed to
demonstrate that maturing technology has
contributed to defense industry consoli-
dation. As technology matures, a domi-
nant design is established, and there is
pressure for firms to consolidate, as fewer
product offerings exist in a market (King,
Covin & Hegarty, 2003).
In the case of fighter aircraft technol-
ogy, following World War II, technology
evolved from reciprocating engines to jet
engines driving changes to basic aircraft
design. Uncertainty about potential perfor-
mance and product design drove a large
number of unique aircraft designs from
multiple defense firms. For example, a
“There are
multiple unique
technologies
required for
different catego-
ries of weapon
systems.”
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total of nine prime contractors designed
and flew 40 different fighter aircraft
designs during the 1940s and 1950s
(Lorell & Levaux, 1998). However, as jet
fighter technology matured the number
of aircraft designs fell with less than a
dozen U.S. fighter aircraft developed
since 1960. Maturing technology contrib-
utes to pressures on major defense firms
to consolidate as fewer aircraft designs re-
quired fewer prime contractors that are ca-
pable of integrating and manufacturing
fighter aircraft. A related observation that
supports this statement is that there have
been no new entrants into U.S. manned
aircraft production since 1945 (Birkler,
Bower, Drezner, Lee, Lorell, Smith,
Trimble, &Younossi, 2003). Additionally,
the aircraft types that are produced are
maintained longer and upgraded more of-
ten. Upgrade contracts are typically
awarded to the original prime contractor,
requiring defense firms to retain a
workforce able to manage multiple tech-
nology insertion programs.
The award of the F-22 Raptor and F-35
Joint Strike Fighter contracts to Lockheed
Martin has resulted in a situation where
no other new manned fighter aircraft
program is in design or planned to be in
design for at least the next 10 years. This
reduction in the number of aircraft de-
signs may be far more influential on in-
dustry consolidation than decreased de-
fense spending. For example, the Joint
Strike Fighter is the largest DoD program
to date in terms of its anticipated budget
value. The consolidation of aircraft type
is also consistent with bomber and cargo
aircraft. We maintain this consolidation of
weapon systems influenced industry con-
solidation more than the cycles in defense
spending. However, institutional factors
also contributed to defense industry
consolidation.
CHANGING INSTITUTIONS
In looking at the consolidation in the
defense industry it is important to consider
the changing institutions. Institutions are
the formal and informal rules along with
their enforcement arrangements that influ-
ence the nature of the transactions and their
costs (Furubotn & Richter, 1998). Com-
bined with evolving technology, chang-
ing institutions have influenced market
forces within the defense industry. We sum-
marize the forces that have influenced de-
fense firms with the goal of providing in-
sight on the drivers of defense industry con-
solidation beyond decreased defense
spending. Specifi-
cally, the evolution
of government pro-
curement practices
has likely impacted
c o n s o l i d a t i o n
within the defense
industry. We exam-
ine the govern-
ment procurement
practices in three
areas—defense pro-
curement policy, re-
quirements gen-
eration, and the
organization of government procurement
agencies—that shape the interaction of ex-
changes between the government and de-
fense contractors.
PROCUREMENT POLICY
Since WWII, a set of diverse organiza-
tions in each service evolved from their
“Maturing technol-
ogy contributes to
pressures on major
defense firms to
consolidate as fewer
aircraft designs
required fewer
prime contractors
that are capable of
integrating and
manufacturing
fighter aircraft.”
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various histories to manage weapons
system procurement. The government
did not buy as a monopsony, instead nu-
merous organizations for each service
acted as independent actors on the mar-
ket for particular service weapons. The
policies of these organizations have
evolved to become unified with the de-
velopment of common policies and regu-
lations. Government procurement policies
and regulations are out-
lined in the DoD 5000
series regulations and
contractual manage-
ment procedures (the
interface with commer-
cial industry) in the
form of the Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation
(FAR). These procure-
ment practices define
the interaction between
the government and
firms in the defense in-
dustry.
The FAR has evolved as an all-encom-
passing regulation governing federal
procurement in the past 20 years—a
period that aligns with the defense
industry’s consolidation. The origin of the
present day FAR was the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 (Nagle, 1999).
Following that act the number and size of
regulations governing procurement
steadily grew. By 1979, there were 877
different sets of procurement regulations
including directives, bulletins, and in-
structions, comprising 64,600 pages of
regulations. Since then, the specific poli-
cies for each armed service and the vari-
ous other non-DoD government agencies
have been consolidating into a single fed-
eral regulation. Progress has been made
to establish the FAR as the single federal
procurement policy (Nagle, 1999).
In general, 20 years ago contractors
specialized not only on a particular wea-
pon system, but also on the unique pro-
curement organization within each armed
service. For example, as recently as the
1980s, each Service had separate con-
tract monitoring processes that drove
firms to specialize in dealing with indi-
vidual armed services. If a firm did
business with multiple branches of the
military, it was not unusual for each service
to have its own contract monitoring
personnel assigned to a firm’s plant full
time.
This has changed over the past 20 years
with a series of unifying events. One
example is the single-process initiative
(SPI) that began, in 1994, and in a matter
of two-years time relieved defense firms
from multiple processes driven by numer-
ous government procurement offices. The
oversight was placed under a single
defense agency, Defense Contract Man-
agement Agency (DCMA), eliminating
almost all of the unique service-oriented
contract monitoring offices.
The creation of a single office fur-
ther contributed to the standardization
of government processes. It should be
noted that the single process initiative
did not eliminate the unique require-
ments of the government, but reduced
the ability of the different DoD agen-
cies and services to require unique pro-
cesses. The contractor could have a
single set of processes for a given fa-
cility or across multiple facilities. As
government procurement became
more standardized, defense firms were
less constrained to specializing for
each armed service—widening their
“In general,
20 years ago
contractors spe-
cialized not only
on a particular
weapon system,
but also on the
unique procure-
ment organization
within each armed
service.”
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opportunities to take advantage of their
specialization. This may have contributed
to defense industry consolidation in that
niche firms may have decided to exit the
industry as they realized their niche would
be encroached upon as uniform govern-
ment procurement practices increased
competition and reduced transaction costs
required to deal with multiple armed ser-
vice weapons procurement organizations.
The same consolidation and standard-
ization that happened on the FAR also oc-
curred with the DoD 5000 series; the policy
focused on government procurement pro-
cesses and thus influenced the structure of
the procurement organizations. The 5000
series was first issued in July 1971, as an
initiative of then Deputy Secretary of De-
fense David Packard (Przemieniecki,
1993) with the primary theme of central-
ized policy and decentralized execution
(Ferrara, 1996). The initial focus was on
the procurement of major weapon systems,
allowing the services to continue to acquire
non-major systems under their own poli-
cies. However, in 1987, the 5000 series
was extended to all procurement programs,
and consolidated over 60 different direc-
tives, instructions and memoranda. The
5000 series has continued to reduce the
number of unique armed services pro-
cesses. This reduction along with the
evolving technology and move toward joint
programs (more than one armed service
involved) has moved the various armed
services toward a single monopsony
(single customer) versus a collection of
monopsony buying related but not the
same products. An example is the past pur-
chase of fighter aircraft by the Navy, like
F/A-18s, and the Air Force, like F-16s, to
the joint purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter.
REQUIREMENTS GENERATION
The requirements generation process
establishes the collective intent of the
government on what weapon systems are
purchased. Requirements generation
operates in conjunction with the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) process used to manage resources
by applying constraints. While internal to
the government, requirements generation
is visible to industry and provides infor-
mation on the future intent of the govern-
ment-buying preferences. Government
selection and procurement of given
weapon systems is not independent of
evolving technology.
The number of aircraft ultimately pur-
chased has fallen as technological ad-
vances deliver additional capability. For
example, by 1958, when the F-4 fighter
prototype first flew (Smith & Friedman,
1980), the speed of fighter aircraft
reached a plateau and
technology changed
to focus on guided
missiles, which repre-
sented a growing per-
centage of aerospace
industry sales and in
many cases were
viewed as a substitute
for aircraft (Simonson,
1968). The increased capability of air-
craft from technology advances, such as
guided weapons, simply translated into a
requirement for fewer numbers of aircraft.
For example, the impact is clearly dem-
onstrated in comparing U.S. Air Force
procurement quantities of F-4 aircraft
(2,600) to F-117 stealth fighters (59).
However, the resulting capability is com-
parable in that a single F-117’s bombing
effectiveness equates to 95 F-4 aircraft
“The number of
aircraft ultimately
purchased has
fallen as techno-
logical advances
deliver additional
capability”
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(Toffler & Toffler, 1993). The general
impact of available technology deliv-
ering more capable weapon platforms
suggests fewer major defense firms were
needed (Deutch, 2001). Additionally, an
increased emphasis on jointness has led
to the Joint Strike Fighter becoming the
single planned replacement aircraft for
the Air Force’s F-16, the Navy’s F/A-
18, and the Marine’s AV-8B.
Further decreasing the number of dif-
ferent aircraft designs, the trend in require-
ments generation has
been toward joint pro-
grams, or programs that
meet the needs of more
than one armed service.
Emphasis on joint
weapon programs has
steadily increased since
the F-111 aircraft was
originally designed to
meet the needs of two
services—the Air Force
and Navy (Smith & Friedman, 1980).
Among other initiatives, the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorga-
nization Act of 1986 made the Joint Chiefs
of Staff advocates for a joint military per-
spective with the vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) responsible
for chairing the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), a special
council on military requirements (Owens,
1994). After the termination of the Navy’s
A-12 aircraft program, in 1991, joint pro-
grams took hold as the dominant paradigm
as the termination essentially ended
service- and mission-unique aircraft
programs (Jefferson, 1991). The empha-
sis on joint programs has also increased
the monopsony power of the government
as procurement is further centralized
from the different armed services.
Another consideration is that each
aircraft program essentially involves a
“winner take all” competition for manu-
facturers. The most recent fighter aircraft
competition involved the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), and the associated devel-
opment contract was awarded to Lock-
heed-Martin and Boeing in November
1996 (Wall Street Journal, 1996a). One
month later, after just ending similar
merger discussions only six months ear-
lier, Boeing announced a merger with
McDonnell Douglas, the loser of the JSF
competition (Wall Street Journal, 1996b).
The only  change in prospects for
McDonnell Douglas, after it scuttled
merger discussions with Boeing earlier the
same year, was the JSF contract award.
As the JSF represented the only major
fighter aircraft contract anticipated for at
least a decade, consolidation represented
a reasonable reaction. The JSF program
also demonstrates the level of emphasis
on joint programs. The JSF is the planned
replacement for the Navy F/A-18, Air
Force F-16 and Marine AV-8B aircraft,
plus aircraft for several foreign military
partners that are participating in the
program. Maturing technology, winner
take all competitions, and increased
emphasis on joint programs all contrib-
uted to fewer aircraft programs that, in
turn, drove consolidation as each factor
signaled a requirement for fewer aircraft
manufacturers.
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
The most existing literature on the de-
fense industry overlooks the organization
of government agencies. However, due to
“Another consider-
ation is that each
aircraft program
essentially in-
volves a ‘winner
take all’  competi-
tion for manufac-
turers.”
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the interaction between government and
defense contractor offices, changes to the
structure of government procurement
organizations also impacts defense firms.
Procurement organizations have under-
gone two primary changes—centralization
and downsizing.
The centralization of procurement
policy and intervention by Congress
through the Goldwater-Nichols Depart-
ment of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, created consistent government pro-
curement oversight by establishing Pro-
gram Executive Officers (PEOs). The PEO
structure for the majority of procurement
programs established a streamlined autho-
rity through the civilian leadership from
the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE),
the most senior service official for acqui-
sitions of weapon systems, to each weapon
system program manager. This change
lessened the influence of other varied
organizations in the DoD and respective
services from the day-to-day operations
of weapons system procurement.
Reduced defense budgets have placed
an emphasis on downsizing of government
procurement agencies that are largely
viewed as ancillary to the armed services
mission of winning wars. Traditionally
government program offices issued vari-
ous contracts to different prime contrac-
tors for different subsystems of an overall
weapon system and the government acted
as the integrator. However, reduced per-
sonnel resources following the end of the
Cold War led to government program of-
fices placing more effort on contract, re-
sulting in a migration of tasks and associ-
ated transactions from the government to
defense firms acting as prime contractors.
This migration of responsibility was
generally known as Total System Program
Responsibility (TSPR). Under this con-
cept a defense firm selected as the prime
contractor for a program was given this
“total responsibility” under broad integra-
tion contracts. The prime contractor is now
often responsible for integration of an
overall system, instead of the govern-
ment’s weapon system program office.
Increased responsibility by prime contrac-
tors had the effect of limiting the number
of contracts available from the government
as subsystem contracts previously issued
by the government
were bundled within
a prime contractor’s
weapon system con-
tract. The combined
effects of centraliza-
tion and downsizing
led to a shift in
workload from govern-
ment-buying agents to
prime defense con-
tractors, and reduced
government unique
transaction costs with
the market. The com-
petitive impact of this
shift in subcontract management from
the government to defense firms is un-
known, and represents an opportunity
for future research.
While the number of government
procurement personnel has decreased,
there was increased emphasis on ensuring
they were better trained. Congress passed
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Im-
provement Act (DAWIA) in 1990, and it
outlined education and certification
procedures for a professional procurement
workforce. Centralization of procurement
policies was followed by centralization of
training, and in 1992 Defense Acquisition
“Reduced
defense budgets
have placed an
emphasis on
downsizing of
government
procurement
agencies that are
largely viewed as
ancillary to the
armed services
mission of
winning wars.”
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University (DAU) was formed. The
consolidation of the training for govern-
ment personnel on the unique institutional
mechanisms and structures further dem-
onstrated government procurement policy
centralization that was helping to prompt
defense industry consolidation. The con-
solidation of processes would only be
strengthened as government procurement
personnel received training on uniform
procurement practices from a centralized
training organization.
SUMMARY
Forces relating to changing technology
and changing government institutional
practice corresponded with decreased de-
fense spending to drive
defense industry consoli-
dation. Changing gov-
ernment practice includes
joint procurement, cen-
tralization of procurement
policy, standardization of
government procurement
organization, and stan-
dardized training of a
core of professional pro-
curement personnel. To-
gether these evolving
changes led to common
government policies that
changed the dynamic in the defense in-
dustry and pressured defense firms to re-
duce transaction costs through consolida-
tion. Viewing the defense industry consoli-
dation using this framework provides a
more complete explanation than reduced
defense spending. The framework also
provides a better foundation for future
policy recommendations.
DISCUSSION
The central message of this paper is that
the U.S. government holds a unique po-
sition in the defense industry as both a
monopsony customer and as a federal
government with regulatory oversight that
controls the mechanisms in the market.
This position allows the government to
have a hyper influence on the institutions
governing the mechanisms of exchange
and thus the structure of the defense
industry. Evolving government policies
and their impact on transaction costs
(North, 1990) brings clarity to explain-
ing recent defense industry consolidation.
Our observations are consistent with
views of institutions impacting transaction
costs and the structure of markets. We find
that both government procurement orga-
nizations and defense firms should be
viewed as rationally reducing transaction
costs and thus the structure of the defense
market. The defense industry experiences
a unique set of transaction costs from those
experienced in commercial-oriented free
markets, and the application of competi-
tive market prescriptions focused on prices
to the defense industry is inappropriate.
An institutional framework that considers
transaction costs provides a more complete
picture for moving forward and assessing
defense industry efficiency issues that con-
cern policy makers. The current view com-
monly held within the government and the
literature focuses on competition driving
defense industry efficiencies and prevent-
ing defense firms from collecting mo-
nopoly rents. This view is derived from
traditional supply and demand models with
multiple suppliers and customers and has
less application considering the unique
nature of the defense industry. For ex-
ample, the Truth in Negotiation Act
“Together these
evolving changes
led to common
government
policies that
changed the
dynamic in the
defense industry
and pressured
defense firms to
reduce transac-
tion costs through
consolidation.”
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(TINA) of 1962 and creation of the De-
fense Contract Audit Agency in 1965
(Lorell, et al., 2000) has created a system
where the government provides a coun-
terbalance to any monopoly power, en-
suring it only pays fair and reasonable
costs for products.
The changes in the defense industry
over the past 20 years represent the gov-
ernment and firms rationally reducing
transaction costs through centralization
and consolidation respectively, but not a
substantial increase use of free market
mechanisms. It is unlikely that the defense
industry will ever approximate a competi-
tive market, as long as the government
remains a monopsony customer with
regulatory oversight.
Any application of a competitive
market framework will shed limited light
on the realities of defense industry struc-
ture and its evolution. We show that ex-
panding the view of the defense industry
to include institutions and related trans-
action cost provides improved explana-
tion for observed defense industry phe-
nomenon, or in the present case industry
consolidation. Institutions and transaction
costs can provide a more realistic frame-
work for economic analysis, and should
play a more active role in framing policy
recommendations.
The defense industry is typically char-
acterized as inefficient. However, deter-
mining the efficiency of a market needs
to consider constraints imposed by trans-
action costs, and an outcome without a
feasible and superior alternative should
be accepted as efficient (Williamson,
1985). The feasibility of alternatives needs
to be understood within the institutions
relating to a market, or relevant legal, eco-
nomic, and political realities, which in the
case of the defense industry, play a larger
role than a traditional competitive mar-
ketplace. For activities in the public sec-
tor, external costs imposed on the operation
of markets may be higher than necessary—
reducing these costs requires modifying
the institutions governing decision-
making heuristics (Buchanan & Tullock,
1962). Indeed, the preoccupation with
rational choice and efficient market often
blind people to the implications of
complex environments and the realities of
incomplete information (North, 1999).
Recognizing path dependence is key to
understanding long-run economic change,
and our review shows the additional forces
that evolving government institutions
placed on defense firms likely contributed
to consolidation.
In closing, reduced defense spending
alone does not fully explain the consoli-
dation of defense firms witnessed during
the 1990s, as decreased defense spending
has occurred in the past without similar
consolidation. The unique nature of the
defense industry makes the application of
traditional price driven explanations and
associated policy recommendations from
competitive markets tenuous. Examination
of the interaction of evolving technology,
changing institutions, to include the pro-
curement policy, weapons requirements
process, and the procurement organizations
on transaction costs in the defense indus-
try will more fully explain the forces driv-
ing consolidation and provide greater in-
sight for policy makers seeking to improve
the performance of the defense industry.
Further research is needed to develop a
robust institutional framework of the de-
fense industry and the related government
agencies.
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ENDNOTE
1. Even Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
typically are handled through the
DoD, or U.S. government.
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